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of generalized reference
Roland Hausser*
Agent‑based ontology
When two agents communicate with each other by means of a natural language, the 
speaker uses its external action interface to produce a sequence of language surfaces 
while the hearer uses its external recognition interface to identify the elements of the 
sequence. The sequence is time-linear in the sense that it is linear like time and in the 
Abstract 
Purpose: Medieval logic defined reference as a relation between language and objects 
in the world.  Recently, however, the term ``representational token’’ has been used 
instead of language (Reimer and Michaelson in The stanford encyclopedia of philoso-
phy: winter 2014 edition. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reference/, 2014). This allows 
for reference with and without language.  In a similar vein, Database Semantics (DBS) 
has implemented concept-based reference as a matching between two contents. If a 
content is attached to a language surface it is called the literal meaning1 of the surface.
Methods: Referring with a content (as a representational token), regardless of whether or 
not it is attached to a surface, leads to a generalized notion of reference. An example of ref-
erence without language is identifying a current nonlanguage recognition with something 
seen before.  Another example is identifying a nonlanguage recognition with an earlier 
language content, e.g. something read (for example, in a guide book) or heard about.
Results: In addition to the concept-based reference mechanism of (i) symbols [We 
follow the terminology used by Peirce (CP 2.228, 2.229, 5.473) for his theory of signs.] 
(“Reference by matching (symbol)” section), natural language uses the reference mech-
anisms of (ii) indexicals (“Reference by pointing (indexical)” section) based on pointers, 
and of (iii) names (“Reference by baptism (name)” section) based on acts of generalized 
baptism.  A fourth kind of reference is co-reference (“Reference by address (corefer-
ence)” section), based on identity implemented by means of an address; it occurs as a 
variant of referring with indexicals and symbols, and is the foundation of name-based 
reference.
Conclusions: This paper systematically reconstructs the mechanisms of reference as 
they function with and without language in an agent-based computational framework. 
Language-dependent surfaces play a role only in the automatic word form recogni-
tion of the hear mode and the automatic word form production of the speak mode.  
In conclusion, the agent-based reconstruction of reference is applied to the medieval 
distinction between de dicto and de re (“De dicto/de re” section).
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direction of time. In accordance with the Western writing convention, the progression of 
time is shown in the direction from left to right.
Physical framework of communication
a
s1 s2 s3 ...
time−linear
r
agent A
r
a
agent B
hearer speaker
The recognition and action interfaces of the agents are indicated by half circles marked 
with r and a, respectively. The language surfaces are represented by boxes containing s1, s2, 
s3…,. As agent-external modality-dependent sound waves (speech), dots on paper (writ-
ing), or gestures (signing), the surfaces may be measured and described with the methods 
of the natural sciences, but have no meaning and no grammatical properties whatsoever.
The first surface leaving the speaker is the first to reach the hearer. The last surface 
leaving the speaker is the last to reach the hearer.1 All other aspects of language commu-
nication are agent-internal, modality2-independent, and cognitive.
Modality-independence may be illustrated by the basic operations of arithmetic, i.e., 
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. They exist at a level of abstraction 
which may be realized equivalently as the operations (1) of a human, (2) a mechanical 
calculator, or (3) an electronic computer.3
With autonomous robots still absent in today’s computational linguistics, the external 
framework “Physical framework of communication” may be simulated, using the key-
board and the screen of standard computers as primitive recognition and action com-
ponents. This, however, works only for the transfer of surfaces. It does not work for 
nonlanguage recognition and action, which are required for a cognitive reconstruction 
of reference. For example, the agent’s ability to refer to agent-external items is needed for 
fulfilling a request like Pick up the blue square! or to report how many blue squares there 
are in the agent’s current task environment.
Elementary concepts
The minimum in reconstructing higher-level cognition is (1) an agent-internal mem-
ory, (2) a central control embedded into and interacting with memory, (3) a mapping 
from the recognition interface to central control, and (4) a mapping from central con-
trol to the action interface. Consider an agent recognizing the non-language object blue 
square:
1 In  ““Physical framework of communication” , “Natural language transfer mechanism”, and “Immediate reference as a 
purely cognitive procedure” this is expressed graphically by placing the hearer to the left and the speaker to the right. If 
the order is reversed, the progression of time would have to shown from right to left.
2 The term modality is being used in several different fields of science. As employed here, modality is known as sensory 
modality (Chen 2006, Sect. 6.13.1)
3 According to (Wiener 1961, p. 132): “Information is information, and not matter or energy.”
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Basic structure of cognition
database
(memory)
blue
  control
  central
cognitive agent
r
a
external reality
The external interfaces of recognition and action constitute the agent’s peripheral cogni-
tion (“Conceptual view of interfaces and components”). In recognition, peripheral cog-
nition maps modality-dependent raw data into modality-independent agent-internal 
concepts. In action, it maps modality-independent blue-prints into modality-dependent 
external raw data. This provides the grounding (Barsalou 2008) of Database Semantics in 
the recognition and action of natural or artificial cognitive agents.
The mappings between modality-dependent raw data and modality-independent con-
cepts are formally based on the type-token distinction, familiar from philosophy.4 The 
type of a concept describes the necessary properties, while an associated token is an 
instantiation with certain additional accidental5 properties. As an example consider the 
recognition of colors (Hausser 1989, p. 296 ff). In physics, they are defined as intervals 
on the one-dimensional scales of electromagnetic wave length and frequency. Accord-
ingly, the type and a token of the color blue may shown as follows:
Type and token of the color called blue
nekotepyt
wavelength: α
frequency: β
wavelength: 470 nm
frequency: 640 THz
where 490–450 nm
and 610–670 THz
The type specifies the wavelength and the frequency of the color blue by means of vari-
ables which are restricted to the corresponding intervals provided by physics. The token 
uses constants which lie within these intervals.
4 The type-token distinction was introduced by Peirce (CP 4: 537).
5 The term accidental is used here in the philosophical tradition of Aristotle (Barnes 1974), who distinguishes in his 
Metaphysics, Books ζ  and η, between the necessary and the accidental (incidental or coincidental—kata sumbebêkos) 
properties of an object in nature.
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In the recognition of colors, the type provided by the agent’s memory and the raw 
input data provided by a sensor interact as follows, resulting in a classified token:
Type and token in color recognition
470 nm
 640 THz
raw input
provided by
sensor hardwarematching type
provided by
memory
w.length: 490−450 nm
color: blue
frequ: 610−670 THz
blue
agent−external
object
cognitive agent
r
a
w.length: 470 nm
frequ: 640 THz
color: blue
instantiating
token to be
stored in memory
A sensor measures the wavelength 470 nm and frequency 640 THz in an agent-external 
object. These values lie within the intervals 490–450 nm and 610–6700 THz of the color 
blue and thus match the type. In the instantiating token, the wavelength and frequency 
intervals of the type are replaced by the measured values. The feature structures repre-
senting concept types and tokens may be extended as needed, for example, with an addi-
tional attribute for color intensity.
Next consider the type and the token of a two-dimensional geometric object:
Type and token of the concept square
nekotepyt


edge 1: α cm
angle 1/2: 90o
edge 2: α cm
angle 2/3: 90o
edge 3: α cm
angle 3/4: 90o
edge 4: α cm
angle 4/1: 90o




edge 1: 2 cm
angle 1/2: 90o
edge 2: 2 cm
angle 2/3: 90o
edge 3: 2 cm
angle 3/4: 90o
edge 4: 2 cm
angle 4/1: 90o


where α is a length
Here, the type and the token share attributes which specify (1) the number of equally 
long edges and (2) the angle of their intersections. The type and the token differ only in 
their edge lengths. The latter is accidental in that the type matches an infinite number of 
square tokens with different edge lengths.6
In analogy to “Type and token in color recognition”, recognition of a square may be 
shown as follows:
6 In an artificial agent, the type may be implemented as a pattern-matching software which recognizes tokens by 
approximating raw bitmap outlines (Hausser 1999, Sect. 3.2.1).
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Type and token in recognizing a square
raw input
provided by
sensor hardware
bitmap
matching type
provided by
memory
angle 4/1: 90°
angle 3/4: 90°
angle 2/3: 90°
angle 1/2: 90°
edge 1:     cmα
edge 2:     cmα
edge 3:     cmα
edge 4:     cmα
blue
agent−external
object
angle 4/1: 90°
angle 3/4: 90°
angle 2/3: 90°
angle 1/2: 90°
edge 1:   2 cm
edge 2:   2 cm
edge 3:   2 cm
edge 4:   2 cm
a
r
cognitive agent
2cm
instantiating
token to be
stored in memory
The type matches the outline of all kinds of different squares, whereby its variables are 
instantiated in the resulting tokens.
Today, there exist pattern recognition programs which are already quite good at recog-
nizing geometric objects.7 They differ from our approach in that they are based almost 
completely on statistics. However, even if the terms of the type and the token may not be 
found in their theoretical descriptions, the type-token distinction is nevertheless implicit 
in any pattern recognition processing. Furthermore, the rule-based, incremental proce-
dures8 of pattern recognition presented in Hausser (2005) are well-suited to be com-
bined with statistical methods.9
The elementary concepts of nonlanguage recognition are complemented by those of 
action. For example, the concept take is defined as the type of a gripping action which is 
instantiated as a token to be realized as raw data. The token differs from the type in that 
it is adapted to a specific gripping occasion. It holds in general for recognition that raw 
data are classified by a type and instantiated as a token, while in action a type is special-
ized into a token which is passed to a suitable action component for realization as raw 
data (Hausser 1999, Sect. 3.3.5).
The interaction between the agent’s external interfaces, the types, the tokens, and the 
memory must be hand in glove. For example, if the agent has no sensor for measur-
ing electromagnetic wavelength/frequency, colors cannot be recognized—even if the 
proper types were available from memory. Conversely, without the types the raw data 
provided by a suitable sensor cannot be classified and instantiated as tokens. Also, with-
out a memory the types cannot be provided for recognition and action, and the tokens 
cannot be stored.
7 As shown by the work of Steels (1999), suitable algorithms may evolve new types automatically from similar data by 
abstracting from what they take to be accidental.
8 They are based on an incremental, memory-based procedure of pattern recognition using geons (Biederman 1987).
9 For building a talking robot, the automatic evolution of types has to result in concepts which correspond to those of 
the intended language community. This may be achieved by presenting the artificial agent with properly selected data in 
combination with human guidance (guided patterns method, Hausser 2011, Sect. 6.2).
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Data structure and database schema
The concepts defined in “Type and token of the color called blue” and “Type and token 
of the concept square” constitute elementary cognitive contents, but they do not provide 
any means for being connected, as in blue_square. For this, DBS lexically embeds the 
concepts as core values into nonrecursive10 feature structures with ordered attributes, 
called proplets (because they are the elementary building blocks of propositions, in anal-
ogy to droplet). A feature structure is built from features. In computer science, a feature 
is defined as an attribute-value pair (avp), e.g. [noun: square], with noun: as the attribute 
and square as the value.
The embedding of core values into proplets allows their concatenation by means of 
value copying. For example, the proplets blue and square may be connected into the 
content of blue_square as follows:11
Concatenation by cross‑copying
nc:
pc:
prn: 17
mdd: square
adj: blue
sem: pad
sur:
cat: adnv
nc:
pc:
prn: 17
mdr: blue
noun: square
cat: snp
sem: def sg
sur:
nc:
pc:
adj: blue
sem: pad
mdd:
sur:
cat: adnv
nc:
pc:
noun: square
cat: snp
sem: def sg
mdr:
sur:
prn:prn: 17
The nature of the semantic relation between blue and square is characterized by the 
attributes mdr (modifier) and mdd (modified). The relation is implemented by copying 
the core value of square into the mdd slot of blue and the core value of blue into the mdr 
slot square. In addition, the prn value of blue, here 17, is copied into the prn slot of the 
next word proplet square.
Next consider extending “Concatenation by cross-copying” to an intrapropositional 
coordination:
Coordination in big blue square
pc:
prn: 17
mdd: square
sem: pad
nc:
prn: 17
sem: pad
mdd:
sur: sur: 
cat: adnv cat: adnv
adj: big adj: blue
pc: big
:cneulb :cn
pc:
prn: 17
noun: square
cat: snp
sem: def sg
sur:
mdr: big
The relation of intrapropositional coordination is coded by the nc (next conjunct) and pc 
(previous conjunct) attributes of the conjoined adjectives.
10 A feature structure is nonrecursive if there is no recursive embedding of feature structures as values. Recursive feature 
structures are unsuitable for (1) contents with a coordination structure, (2) the pattern matching needed for (a) modeling 
reference and (b) applying operation patterns to input, and (3) storage and retrieval in a database. Unordered attributes are 
inefficient for computers and humans alike. Recursive feature structures with unordered attributes are not used in DBS.
11 The algorithm used for connecting (hear mode) and activating (think mode) proplets is time-linear Left-Associative 
Grammar (Hausser 1992). The sur attribute takes the language dependent surface as value. For a detailed description of 
the attributes and values used in proplets for describing English see Hausser (2006; Appendix A3).
Page 7 of 26Hausser  Complex Adapt Syst Model  (2017) 5:2 
The diagonal lines in “Coordination in big blue square” are intended as optical sup-
port for the reader. Technically, however, they are redundant and may be omitted. The 
real method of establishing semantic relations in DBS is by addresses coded declaratively 
as values and implemented procedurally as pointers. This method makes the proplets 
forming a complex content order-free, allowing the database to store them indepen-
dently of the semantic relations between them.
For example, no matter where the storage mechanism of the database puts the adnom-
inal big, its modified may be found via the primary key consisting of the mdd value 
square and the prn value 17. Similarly, no matter where the noun square is stored, its 
modifier may be found via the mdr value big and the prn value 17. And accordingly for 
the intrapropositional coordination in “Coordination in big blue square”.
As another example consider the content of Julia knows John., represented as the fol-
lowing set of connected proplets:
Content of Julia knows John. as a set of proplets


sur: Julia
noun: Julia
cat: snp
fnc: know
prn: 625




sur: knows
verb: know
cat: #s3 #a decl
arg: Julia John
prn: 625




sur: John
noun: John
cat: snp
fnc: know
prn: 625


The simplified proplets are held together by a common prn value, here 625. The functor-
argument is coded solely in terms of attribute values. For example, the Julia and John 
proplets specify their functor as know, while the know proplet specifies Julia and John as 
its arguments. Because of their nonempty sur(face) slots, the proplets are language prop-
lets, in contradistinction to the proplets in “Concatenation by cross-copying” and “Coor-
dination in big blue square”, which are context proplets. For storage and retrieval, a 
proplet is specified uniquely12 by its core and prn values (primary key). This suggests a 
two-dimensional database schema, as in a classic network database (Elmasri and Nav-
athe 2010). However, instead of using member and owner records, DBS uses member 
proplets and owner values.
The result is called a word bank. Its database schema consists of a column of owner 
values in their alphabetical order (vertical). Each owner value is preceded by an empty 
slot, called the now front, and a list of member proplets (horizontal); together they con-
stitute a token line.13
As an example, consider storing “Content of Julia knows John. as a set of proplets” as a 
nonlanguage content:
12 Propositions containing two or more proplets with the same values, as in Suzy loves Suzy, require extra attention. 
They constitute a special case which (1) rarely occurs and (2) is disregarded here because it may be easily handled by the 
software.
13 The token line for any core value is found by using a trie structure (Briandais 1959; Fredkin 1960). The search for a 
proplet within a token line may use the prn value of the address in relation to the strictly linear increasing prn values. 
As pointed out by J. Handl (2008, 2012), this may be based on binary search, in time O(log(n)) (Cormen et al. 2009), or 
interpolation, in time O(log(log(n))) (Weiss 2005), where n is the length of the token line.
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Storing “Content of Julia knows John, as a set of proplets” in a word bank
member proplets now front owner values
. . .


noun: John
cat: snp
fnc: know
prn: 625


John
. . .


noun: Julia
cat: snp
fnc: know
prn: 625


Julia
. . .


verb: know
cat: #n-s3 #a decl
arg: Julia John
prn: 625


know
The proplets in a token line all have the same core value and are in the temporal order of 
arrival, reflected by their prn values (Hausser 2006, Sects. 11.2, 11.3).
In contrast to the task of designing a practical schema for arranging the books in a pri-
vate library, the sorting of proplets into a word bank is simple and mechanical. The letter 
sequence of a proplet’s core value completely determines its token line for storage: the 
storage location for any new arrival is the penultimate position (now front) in the cor-
responding token line. When this slot is filled, the now front is reopened by moving the 
owner value one slot to the right (or, equivalently, pushing the member proplets one slot 
to the left, as in a push-down automaton).
By storing content like sediment, the stored data are never modified and any need 
for checking consistency is obviated. Changes of fact are written to the now front, like 
diary entries recording changes of temperature. Current data which refer to old ones use 
addresses as core values, implemented as pointers.
Cycle of natural language communication
The transfer mechanism of content from the speaker to the hearer is based on external 
surfaces which have neither a meaning nor any grammatical properties (“Physical frame-
work of communication”). They must, however, belong to a language which the speaker 
and the hearer have each learned.
The learning enables the hearer to (1) recognize surfaces, (2) use the recognized but 
otherwise unanalyzed surfaces for looking up lexical entries which provide the meaning 
and the grammatical properties, and (3) connect them with the semantic relations of 
functor-argument and coordination. The learning enables the speaker to (1) navigate 
along the semantic relations between proplets, (2) produce language-dependent word 
form surfaces from the core values of proplets traversed, and (3) handle function word14 
precipitation, micro word order, and agreement.
Successful communication between a speaker and a hearer is defined as follows:
14 Examples of function words in English are determiners like a(n), the, some, every, all, prepositions like in, on, above, 
below, auxiliaries like be, have, do, coordinating conjunctions like and, or, and subordinating conjunctions like that, who, 
which, when, because.
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Definition of successful communication
Natural language communication is successful if the content, mapped by the speaker 
into a sequence of external word form surfaces, is reconstructed and stored equiva-
lently by the hearer.
Using the word bank content of  “Julia knows John,” the transfer of information from 
the speaker to the hearer, based solely (1) on unanalyzed external surfaces and (2) the 
data structure and database schema of the agents’ cognition, may be shown schemati-
cally as follows:
Natural language transfer mechanism
prn: 625
prn: 625
prn: 625
prn: 625
prn: 625
prn: 625
noun:
fnc: know
noun:
fnc: know
John
Julia
sign Julia    knows    John
verb: know
arg: Julia John
Julia
John noun: 
fnc: know
John
noun:
fnc: know
Julia
verb: know
arg: Julia John
know
hearer: key−word−based storage speaker: retrieval−based navigation
43
2
1
The speaker’s navigation through a set of connected proplets serves as the conceptual-
ization (what to say) and as the basic serialization (how to say it) of natural language 
production (McKeown 1985; Kass and Finin 1988). The hearer’s interpretation consists 
in deriving a corresponding set of proplets, based on automatic word form recognition 
and syntactic-semantic parsing. The time-linear order of the sign induced by the speak-
er’s navigation is eliminated in the hear mode, allowing storage of the proplets in accord-
ance with the database schema of the content-addressable15 word bank. When the agent 
switches into the speak mode, order is reintroduced by navigating along the semantic 
relations between the proplets.
15 As a database, a word bank is content-addressable because it does not use an index (inverted file), in contrast to the 
widely used coordinate-addressable databases (RDBMS). See Chisvin and Duckworth (1992) for an overview.
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Conceptual reconstruction of reference
In DBS, a cognitive content is defined as a set of proplets connected by address. Prop-
lets with a non-empty sur(face) slot (“Content of Julia knows John. as a set of proplets”) 
represent a language content. Proplets with an empty sur slot (“Concatenation by cross-
copying”) represent a context content. Otherwise, language and context proplets are 
alike. This holds specifically for their storage and retrieval in a word bank, which is based 
solely on their core value and order of arrival.
Conceptually, however, the schema “Basic structure of cognition”  may be refined by 
(1) separating the levels of language and context, (2) introducing the place of pragmatics 
as an interaction between the two levels, and (3) distinguishing peripheral and central 
cognition.
Conceptual view of interfaces and components
theory of grammar
theory of language
context component
central cognition
language component
peripheral cognition
cognitive agent
external reality
reference
recognition
action
Externally, the agent’s interfaces for language and nonlanguage recognition are the same, 
as are those for language and nonlanguage action.16 Internally, however, raw input data are 
separated by peripheral cognition into language and nonlanguage content (diagonal input 
arrows). Conversely in action, which realizes a content as raw output data regardless of 
whether it originated at the language or at the context level (diagonal output arrows).
For example, as a sound pattern the surface blue square will have a meaningful inter-
pretation at the language level by someone who has learned English, but be treated as 
an uninterpreted noise at the context level by someone who has not. Conversely, even 
though the action of denying entrance may be realized by telling to go away (originating 
at the language level) or by slamming the door (originating at the context level), both 
result in raw output data.
The distinction between the language and the context component provides a cogni-
tive treatment of reference. Reference to an object in the agent’s current environment 
is called immediate reference, while reference to cognitive content existing only in the 
16 A differentiation into the sensory modalities (vision, audition, locomotion, manipulation) is omitted—not only for sim-
plicity, but also because the meaning of a word or expression is independent of the modality of its external surface. For 
example, the meaning of the word square (“Type and token of the concept square”) is the same regardless of whether its 
surface is realized in speech, writing, or signing. A nonlanguage concept like the shape, color, taste, etc., of a blueberry may 
also be assumed to be independent from the modalities of its recognition (Hausser 2011, Sects. 2.2–2.4).
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agents’ memory, for example, J.S. Bach, is called mediated reference. For mediated refer-
ence, the agent-based ontology of DBS (“Agent-based ontology”) is essential.
As an example of immediate reference consider a speaker and a hearer in a common 
task environment (Newell and Simon 1972) and looking at a blue square. If the speaker 
says Take the blue square, the noun phrase refers to the object in question. Similarly for 
the hearer, for whom fulfilling the request requires reference to the same object.
Postulating an external relation between a surface and its referent would be a reifica-
tion fallacy. Instead we reconstruct immediate reference cognitively:
Immediate reference as a purely cognitive procedure
external
referentcontext component
pragmatics
central cognition
language component
peripheral cognition
hearer
context component
pragmatics
central cognition
language component
peripheral cognition
speaker
modality−dependent
unanalyzed external
word form surfaces
sign = sequence of 
s1 s2 s3 ...
external reality
Immediate reference relies on the agents’ action and recognition interfaces for language 
(upper level) and the recognition of nonlanguage content (lower level). Mediated refer-
ence, in contrast, relies on language action and recognition (upper level) and the exist-
ence of corresponding content in the agent’s memory. While immediate reference may 
be regarded as prototypical for the origin of language, it is a special case of mediated 
reference in that it has the additional requirement of context recognition (Hausser 2006, 
Sect. 2.5).
Terminological remark
Computer Science uses the term “reference” differently from analytic philosophy and 
linguistics. A computational reference is an address in a storage location. This may be 
coded as (1) a symbolic address (declarative) or as (2) a pointer to a physical storage 
location in the memory hardware (procedural). The term “generalized reference” is used 
in computational image reconstruction (computer vision).
In DBS, the term “reference” is used in the sense of philosophy and linguistics. How-
ever, the term is generalized insofar as no agent-external “representational token” is 
required (“Constellations of generalized reference”, constellations 1 and 3). 
Recanati (1997, 2004), Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998), and others use the term “general-
ized reference” for an analysis of the sign kind name which allows the surface Mary, for 
example, to refer to several different individuals. This is in contradistinction to Russell 
(1905) whose definite description17 analysis of “proper” names requires a unique 
referent.
17 For a modern variant of this approach see Burgess (2012).
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The DBS analysis of names in “Reference by baptism (name)” also allows different 
referents (“Name referring with multiple referents”). However, while the “generalized 
reference” of Recanati, Pelczar et al., and others is based on assimilating names to the 
parameters of indexicals, the DBS analysis is traditional in that it is based on an act of 
baptism which is generalized in that it may occur implicitly as well as explicitly. More-
over, generalized reference in DBS is not limited to names, but includes reference by 
means of matching concepts (symbol) and pointing (indexical). In addition, DBS treats 
coreference (identity) by means of address, which occurs as a variant of matching and 
pointer reference, and provides object permanence (“Object permanence by using 
address”) for baptism-based reference.
Reference by matching (symbol)
The reference mechanism based on matching uses the type-token relation (“Type and 
token of the color called blue”, “Type and token of the concept called square”) and is 
associated with the sign kind symbol. For example, the terms a blue square and blue 
squares in the sentence sequence John saw a blue square. ... Blue squares are rare. are 
related as follows:
Reference with language proplets in token lines
member proplets now front owner values

sur:
adj: blue (token)
mdd: square
prn: 41

 . . .


sur: blue
adj: blue (type)
mdd: square
prn: 48


blue
. . .

sur:
noun: square (token)
sem: indef sg
fnc: see
mdr: blue
prn: 41


. . .


sur: square
noun: square (type)
sem: indef pl
fnc: rare
mdr: blue
prn: 48


square
Stored in the agent’s word bank, the vertical relation between the language and the con-
text component shown in “Conceptual view of interfaces and components” reappears 
as a horizontal relation between proplets within token lines. The proplets with the prn 
value 48 are the language proplets (non-empty sur slots), those with the prn value 41 are 
the context proplets (empty sur slots). Reference by matching holds between the two 
blue proplets with the prn values 41 and 48 and similarly between the two square prop-
lets. The distinction between the type and the token, here indicated after the core values, 
is usually left implicit.
The combination of the proplets blue and square by means of a functor-argument rela-
tion is coded by the features [mdd: square] and [mdr: blue], respectively. The noun pro-
plet with the feature [sem: indef sg] is an indefinite singular, that with the feature [sem: 
indef pl] is an indefinite plural.
Next consider the same reference relation without language. The missing sur values 
are emphasized with “∅.”
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Reference by matching without language
member proplets now front owner values


sur:
adj: blue (token)
mdd: square
prn: 41

 . . .


sur: ∅
adj: blue (type)
mdd: square
prn: 48

 blue
. . .

sur:
noun: square (token)
sem: indef sg
fnc: see
mdr: blue
prn: 41


. . .


sur: ∅
noun: square (type)
sem: indef pl
fnc: rare
mdr: blue
prn: 48


square
Here the reference relation holds between two nonlanguage contents—and not between 
a language content (meaning1) and a nonlanguage content, as in “Reference with lan-
guage proplets in token lines”.
Even though the reference relation is established between two individual proplet pairs 
in the same token lines, the combination into the complex content corresponding to 
blue square is accommodated as well18: in order to match, the two blue proplets must 
not only have the same19 core value, but also the same mdd continuation value, here 
square, and correspondingly for the mdr values of the two square proplets. Their fnc and 
prn values, however, are different.
Generalizing reference by matching to include referring with nonlanguage content 
results in the following constellations:
Constellations of generalized reference
1. Nonlanguage content referring to nonlanguage content Example: Agent sees some-
thing and identifies it with something seen before.
2. Language content referring to nonlanguage content Example: Agent describes a land-
scape in speak mode.
3. Nonlanguage content referring to language content Example: Agent identifies a cur-
rent nonlanguage recognition with something it has read (for example, in a guide 
book) or heard about before.
4. Language content referring to language content Example: Agent describes what it has 
heard or read.
Cognitive agents without language are capable of reference constellation 1 only, while 
agents with language may use all four.
Reference by pointing (indexical)
The second reference mechanism of cognition is based on pointing. In natural language, 
it is illustrated by the indexical signs, such as the pronouns. The first step toward a com-
putational implementation is the linguistic observation that the indexicals point at only 
18 Apparently, Aristotle struggled to reconcile reference with content combination (Modrak 2001).
19 Disregarding the type-token distinction.
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five different parameters, namely (1) first person, (2) second person, (3) third person, (4) 
place, and (5) time.
In English, the pronouns I, me, mine, we, and us point at the parameter for first per-
son. The pronoun you points at the parameter for second person. The pronouns he, him, 
his, she, her, it, they and them point at the parameter for third person. The indexical adjs 
here and there point at the parameter for place. The indexical adjs now, yesterday, and 
tomorrow point at the parameter for time.
The indexical nouns pointing at the parameters of first, second, and third person are 
varied by grammatical distinctions. Consider the following examples illustrating gram-
matical variation in 1st person pronouns of English:
1st person pronouns distinctions


sur: I
noun: pro1
cat: s1
sem: sg
fnc:
mdr:
nc:
pc:
prn:




sur: me
noun: pro1
cat: obl
sem: sg
fnc:
mdr:
nc:
pc:
prn:




sur: we
noun: pro1
cat: p1
sem: pl
fnc:
mdr:
nc:
pc:
prn:




sur: us
noun: pro1
cat: obl
sem: pl
mdr:
fnc:
nc:
pc:
prn:


The proplets all share the indexical pointer pro1 as their core value. The different cat 
values s1 (first person singular), p1 (first person plural), and obl (oblique) control verb 
agreement, preventing, for example, ungrammatical *Me saw a tree or *Peter saw we. 
Ungrammatical *I sees a tree and *he see a tree are prevented by using the different cat 
values s1 (singular 1st person) and s3 (singular 3rd person).
Noun proplets of the sign kind indexical combine in the same way into propositions as 
proplets of the sign kind symbol or name. Consider the DBS analysis of English I heard you.:
Representing I heard you. as a language content


sur: I
noun: pro1
cat: s1
sem: sg
fnc: hear
mdr:
nc:
pc:
prn: 71




sur: heard
verb: hear
cat: #n #a decl
sem: past
arg: pro1 pro2
mdr:
nc:
pc:
prn: 71




sur: you
noun: pro2
cat: sp2
sem:
fnc: hear
mdr:
nc:
pc:
prn: 71


The question raised by this example is how the indexical pointers pro1 and pro2 are to 
be interpreted pragmatically relative to a context of use.
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This leads to the second step of modeling the indexical reference mechanism. It is 
based on combining a propositional content with a cluster of parameter values of the 
agent’s current STAR (Hausser 1999, Sect. 5.3). The STAR is an acronym for (1) location 
(Space), (2) time (Time), (3) self-identity (Agent), and (4) intended addressee (Recipient).
The STAR has two functions: (a) keeping track of the agent’s current situation (orien-
tation) and (b) providing referents for indexicals occurring in contents.20 A STAR is 
coded as a proplet with the value of the A attribute serving as the core value and as the 
owner. In a word bank, a temporal sequence of STARs records the output of the agent’s 
on-board orientation system and is listed as a token line:
Token line example of STARs defined as proplets
member proplets now front owner value

S: kitchen
T: t1– t2
A: Sylvester
R: Speedy
3rd:
prn: 63–70




S: kitchen
T: t2+1– t3
A: Sylvester
R: Speedy
3rd:
prn: 71–78




S: living room
T: t3+1– t4
A: Sylvester
R: Tweety
3rd: Speedy
prn: 79–82




S: garden
T: t4+1– t5
A: Sylvester
R: Hector
3rd:
prn: 83–87


Sylvester
In addition to attributes represented by the letters of the STAR, there is a fifth, called 
3rd, for third person indexicals. Though not required for the agent’s basic orientation, 
3rd is needed to provide the referent for items which are neither 1st nor 2nd person.21 
As indicated by the prn values, e.g. [prn: 63–70], several consecutive propositions may 
share the same STAR.22
In natural language communication, three perspectives on content must be distin-
guished (Hausser 2011 Chaps. 10, 11). The STAR-0 is the agent’s perspective onto its 
current environment; it need not involve language. The STAR-1 is the agent’s speak 
mode perspective onto stored content as required for language production; if ongoing 
events are reported directly, the STAR-1 equals the STAR-0. The STAR-2 is the agent’s 
hear mode perspective onto language content as needed for the correct interpretation of 
indexicals. As an example of a STAR-0 perspective, consider the non-language content 
corresponding to I hear you:
20 Integrating the interpretation of indexicals into the agent’s on-board STAR orientation may be seen as an enhance-
ment of Montague (1973), who’s sign-oriented approach uses arbitrary parameter values, i.e. i ǫ I for a moment of time 
and j  ǫ J for a possible world (space, location), superscripted at the end of a lambda expression. Introducing additional 
parameters for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd person, as has been suggested, has been made light of by Cresswell’s (1972, p. 4) joking 
proposal of a “next drink parameter.” The parameter approach has resurfaced as “Variablism,” i.e. the view that names 
and pronouns should be treated semantically as variables (Cumming 2008).
21 According to King (2014), a context consists of time, location, agent, and world. In the STAR of DBS, S corresponds 
to King’s location, T to time, and A to agent. The DBS counterpart to King’s world are R (intended recipient, you) and 
3rd (everyone and everything that is neither A nor R). However, DBS distinguishes between the STAR parameters as the 
agent’s on-board orientation system and basis for interpreting indexicals, on the one hand, and the context as a selec-
tively activated content in memory, on the other.
22 Instead of the names John, Mary,  etc., usually employed in linguistic examples,  let us use the animation characters 
of Sylvester the cat,  Speedy Gonzales the mouse,  Tweety the bird, and Hector the dog, familiar from TV, as an aid to 
distinguish the individuals pointed at by indexicals.
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Anchoring a content to a STAR‑0


sur:
noun: pro1
cat: s1
sem: sg
fnc: hear
mdr:
nc:
pc:
prn: 63




sur:
verb: hear
cat: #n #a decl
sem: pres
arg: pro1 pro2
mdr:
nc:
pc:
prn: 63




sur:
noun: pro2
cat: sp2
sem:
fnc: hear
mdr:
nc:
pc:
prn: 63




S: kitchen
T: 2013-09...
A: Sylvester
R: Speedy
3rd:
prn: 63


This content differs from representing “I heard you.” as a language content because (1) 
it is nonlanguage (no sur values), (2) the sem value of the verb is pres (present tense) 
rather than past, and (3) a STAR is attached by having the same prn value as the content, 
here 63.
The STAR-0 shows the perspective of the agent Sylvester on his current environment. 
The S value specifies the location as the kitchen, the pres value of the verb points at the T 
value, the indexical pro1 points at the A value Sylvester the cat, and pro2 points at the R 
value Speedy the mouse.
Next Sylvester realizes the content in language by saying to Speedy I heard you. As 
time has moved, the language content representing “I heard you”  is anchored to a sec-
ond, later STAR-0 with the prn value 71. From these two STAR-0, the agent computes 
the following STAR-1 perspective for the language content “Representing I heard you. as 
a language content”:
Speak mode anchoring to a STAR‑1


sur: I
noun: pro1
cat: s1
sem: sg
fnc: hear
mdr:
nc:
pc:
prn: 64




sur: heard
verb: hear
cat: #n #a decl
sem: past
arg: pro1 pro2
mdr:
nc:
pc:
prn: 64




sur: you
noun: pro2
cat: sp2
sem:
fnc: hear
mdr:
nc:
pc:
prn: 64




S: kitchen
T: 2013-09...
A: Sylvester
R: Speedy
3rd:
prn: 64


The agent’s perspective is looking from his present situation back on the stored content 
“Anchoring a content to a STAR-0” and encoding it in language. The content is connected 
to the agent’s current STAR via the common prn value 64. The content differs from that of 
“Anchoring a content to a STAR-0” in (i) the sem value past (rather than pres) of the verb 
proplet and (ii) the language-dependent sur values of the content proplets.
When the language content “I heard you” is interpreted by the addressee (recipient), 
Speedy the mouse uses the content of the language sign and its current STAR-0 to derive 
the STAR-2 perspective. The result is as follows:
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STAR‑2 perspective in hear mode


sur:
noun: pro2
cat: sp2
sem:
fnc: hear
mdr:
nc:
pc:
prn: 53




sur:
verb: hear
cat: #n #a decl
sem: past
arg: pro2 pro1
mdr:
nc:
pc:
prn: 53




sur:
noun: pro1
cat: obl
sem: sg
fnc: hear
mdr:
nc:
pc:
prn: 53




S: kitchen
T: 2013-09...
A: Speedy
R: Sylvester
3rd:
prn: 53


Speedy as the interpreting agent uses his personal prn value and a different STAR: com-
pared to the STAR of Sylvester, the A and R values are reversed and Sylvester’s I heard 
you is reinterpreted by Speedy’s STAR-2 perspective as you heard me.
Case study
The use of pronouns in indexical use has been illustrated with a case study which ana-
lyzes a dialog (Hausser 2011, Chapter 10). It illustrates the production and interpretation 
of indexicals with explicit STARs for the speak and the hear mode in statements, WH 
and Yes/No questions with answers, and a request with fulfillment. The use of pronouns 
in coreferential use is systematically investigated in Chapter 11 of Hausser (2011).
Reference by baptism (name)
Just like the other two reference mechanisms, the baptism-based reference of names is 
implemented as a cognitive operation. It consists of (1) establishing object permanence23 
and (2) baptism based on cross-copying between a name and its referent.
For implementing object permanence, DBS uses identity by address. For example, 
when a robot observes an unfamiliar dog running through the bushes, it must under-
stand that the different appearances are instances of the same referent. This recognition 
interpretation, which is based on yet another type-token relation, is coded by using an 
address as the core value of the non-initial proplets, pointing at the proplet representing 
the initial appearance of the referent:
Object permanence by using address
eulavrenwotnorfwonstelporprebmem

sur:
noun: dog
. . .
prn: 83




sur:
noun: (dog 83)
. . .
prn: 99




sur:
noun: (dog 83)
. . .
prn: 112




sur:
noun: (dog 83)
. . .
prn: 131


dog
The different prn values indicate that each member proplet is part of a different proposi-
tion, allowing different continuation values. The core values (dog 83) of the non-initial 
member proplets point at the initial proplet, which is the referent and formally recogniz-
able by its non-address24 core value.
23 The notion of object-permanence originated in cognitive psychology (Piaget 1954). It may be regarded as a non-truth-
conditional, non-modal counterpart to “rigid designators” (Kripke 1972).
24 While continuation values are always addresses, core values may be non-address or address.
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A token line like “Object permanence by using address” may contain several initial dog 
referents, each referring to another individual. They are distinguished by their different 
prn values and the address numbers of the associated coreferent proplets. This is suffi-
cient for the agent to properly discriminate between different dog referents in cognition 
and between their sets of coreferent proplets, all in the same token line.25
It is not sufficient, however, for language communication. This is because the prn values 
of referents are not synchronized between agents: agents may encounter the same refer-
ent at different occasions, and the number of coreferent items may differ between agents. 
What is needed is a name surface and an interagent consensus on which item(s) the name 
refers to. The consensus is simply achieved: the not yet initiated agent follows the practice 
observed because communication would break down otherwise (no private language!).
The DBS implementation is based on (1) a lexical name proplet which has a sur(face) 
value but no core value and (2) a connected referent proplet which has a core value but 
no sur value. The two proplets are supplemented by an event of generalized baptism 
which cross-copies the sur value of the name into the sur slot of the referent and the core 
value of the referent into core slot of the name.
Baptism as cross‑copying
sur:
noun: daughter
prn: 21 prn:
sur: Mary
supplemented name
noun: (daughter 21)
prn:
sur: Mary
noun:
sur: Mary
noun: daughter
prn: 21
named referent
The named referent proplet is stored in the token line of the core value and used in the 
speak mode. The supplemented name proplet is stored in the token line of the surface 
and used in the hear mode.
The baptizing event is formalized as the following DBS operation:
Applying the formal baptizing operation
pattern
level


sur:
noun: α
sem: X
prn: K




sur: β
noun:
sem: nm
prn:

 ⇒


sur: β
noun: α
sem: nm X
prn: K




sur: β
noun: (α K)
sem: nm
prn:


⇑ ⇓
content
level


sur:
noun: daughter
cat: snp
sem: def sg
fnc: read
. . .
prn: 21




sur: Mary
noun:
cat:
sem: nm
fnc:
. . .
prn:




sur: Mary
noun: daughter
cat: snp
s.: nm def sg
fnc: read
. . .
prn: 21




sur: Mary
noun: (daughter 21)
cat: snp
sem: nm
fnc:
. . .
prn:


The third proplet at the content level is the named referent. As a member proplet in the 
agent’s word bank, it has a prn value, here 21. The supplemented sur value is used in the 
speak mode to realize the name surface. The fourth proplet is the supplemented name. 
25 In agents without language, it is a pre-stage of naming (part of case 1 in “Constellations of generalized reference”).
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Its core value is the address of the referent. The prn value will be provided by a hear 
mode derivation (e.g. Hausser 2006, Sect. 3.4.2).
The two proplets resulting in “Applying the formal baptizing operation” look similar, 
but they are stored in different token lines and used in the different roles of the speaker 
and the hearer. Consider the following word bank containing three referents named 
Mary, referring to the grandmother, the mother, and the daughter in a family. The token 
lines are in the alphabetical order daughter, grandmother, Mary, mother.26
Name referring with multiple referents
member proplets now front owner values


sur: Mary
noun: daughter
cat: snp
sem: nm f
fnc: sing
. . .
prn: 21


daughter


sur: Mary
noun: grandm.
cat: snp
sem: nm f
fnc: cook
. . .
prn: 7


grandmother


sur: Mary
noun: (grandm. 7)
cat: snp
sem: nm f
fnc:
. . .
prn:




sur: Mary
noun: (mother 14)
cat: snp
sem: nm f
fnc:
. . .
prn:




sur: Mary
noun: (daughter 21)
cat: snp
sem: nm f
fnc:
. . .
prn:


Mary


sur: Mary
noun: mother
cat: snp
sem: nm f
fnc: read
. . .
prn: 14


mother
The member proplets show the result of three baptism operations like “Applying the for-
mal baptizing operation”. In the token line of Mary, each supplemented name proplet 
occurs only once. Supplemented names are not written into the lexicon because a core 
value like (daughter 21) is not a convention of the natural language at hand. Instead it is 
the result of a generalized baptism event witnessed by the agent. Nevertheless, the sup-
plemented name proplets in the Mary token line have a lexical quality in that they have 
26 For clarity, each supplemented name proplet and its referent are shown in the same column. In reality, token lines 
order proplets contiguously, without any empty positions, solely in accordance with the proplets’ arrival. Thus, token 
lines are “dense” and independent of each other.
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neither continuation nor prn values—like the lexical proplets resulting from automatic 
word form recognition.27
When the hearer interprets a sentence containing a name, the name activates the cor-
responding token line, here that of Mary. The choice between different referents, here the 
grandmother, the mother, and the daughter, may have one of the following results: (1) the 
chosen referent equals the one intended by the speaker (correct choice), (2) does not equal 
the one intended by the speaker (incorrect choice), or (3) no referent is chosen (inconclu-
sive result). The choice between multiple potential name referents is usually not at ran-
dom, however. Instead, the referent most suitable to the utterance situation will usually be 
the correct one. If uncertainty remains, the hearer may ask the speaker for clarification.
For an agent in the speak mode, there is no ambiguity. Instead, the speaker selects the 
intended referent, e.g. (daughter 21). If the agent acquired the appropriate name in the 
hear mode (“Applying the formal baptizing operation”), it is preserved in the word bank 
(“Known name refers to known referent”) and may be used in the speak mode. If the agent 
is in the position to select and bestow a name, it is also available for realization.
Depending on whether or not an agent’s word bank already has a token line (1) for a 
certain name and (2) proplets for its referent(s), the following case distinctions may be 
described in the name interpretation of the hearer:
Case distinctions of name reference
1. the name and the referent have been used before,
2. the name has been used before, but the referent is new,
3. the name has not been used before, but the referent exists, or
4. neither the name nor the referent have been used before by the agent.
As an example of case 1, consider agent A observing daughter Mary eating a cookie. 
Later agent A reports to agent B Mary ate a cookie. Assuming that agent B knows the 
intended referent of Mary, the following proposition would be stored in the word bank 
of agent B (hear mode):
Known name refers to known referent


sur: mary
noun: (daughter 21)
fnc: eat
prn: 102




sur:
verb: eat
arg: (daughter 21) cookie
prn: 102




sur:
noun: cookie
fnc: eat
prn: 102


The proplets are held together by the common prn value 102. As a named referent, the 
first proplet is stored in the token line of the core value. The sur values are not preserved 
27 Our computational reconstruction of the baptism event based on cross-copying differs from other theories of naming 
such as the descriptive theory of proper names (Russell 1905) and the rigid designator analysis (Kripke 1972), which use 
the perspective of an external observer instead of an agent-based ontology. The formal DBS treatment of baptism-based 
reference (“Baptism as cross-copying”) provides a simple, efficient procedural implementation suitable for building a 
talking robot.
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in storage.28 Instead they will be provided by language-dependent lexicalization rules in 
the speak mode. The address values point at the initial referent (object permanence, 
“Object permanence by using address”).
The second case is illustrated by agent B knowing the grandmother and mother refer-
ents of Mary, but not the daughter referent. This means that the token line of Mary exists 
in the word bank of agent B, though without a supplemented name proplet pointing at 
the referent proplet daughter. The token line of daughter may not even contain a content 
proplet suitable as the referent. The two missing proplets may be added to agent’s B word 
bank by agent A saying Did you know that Mary’s daughter is called Mary as well?
The third case is illustrated by an unfamiliar dog running through the bushes. Its pro-
plet representation is added to the existing token line for dog. This still unnamed initial 
referent is recognizable by its non-address core value. When the dog is called Fido, the 
name is written into the sur slot of initial dog proplet (named referent, “Applying the 
formal baptizing operation”) and the supplemented name proplet is stored in the Fido 
token line. If the name has not been used before, a new token line is created for it by 
defining a token line using the name’s surface as the owner value.
The fourth case is illustrated by meeting an unknown animal in a zoo and learning 
that it is called Rosie. Thus a word bank must provide for two dimensions of continuous 
extension: (1) the time-linear lengthening of token lines (horizontal) and (2) the inser-
tion of new token lines into the column of owner values (vertical).
Reference by address (coreference)
Coreference by address occurs with all three sign kinds. In reference by baptism (name) 
it is the only mechanism for relating the supplemented name to the named referent. In 
reference by matching (symbol) and by pointing (indexical), in contrast, it is an addi-
tional mechanism. Let us begin with the coreferential interpretation of a symbol in the 
sequence a unicorn ... the unicorn:
Coreference in a token line
member proplets now front owner value

noun: unicorn
sem: indef sg
prn: 23

 . . .


noun: (unicorn 23)
sem: def sg
prn: 26


unicorn
The coreference relation is coded by using the address of the first proplet as the core 
value of the second. The second proplet must be a definite noun.
The other sign kind with a coreferential interpretation in addition to its own reference 
mechanism is the indexical. The coreferential interpretation of a pointer (e.g. 3rd person 
pronoun) uses the address of a preceding (antecedent) or following (postcedent) refer-
ent, instead of referring to the STAR. Reusing the example in “Reference by pointing 
(indexical)”, consider the extrapropositional coordination “Speedy hid in the cupboard. I 
heard him.” uttered by Sylvester and interpreted by Hector.
28 The name proplet preserves the sur value resulting from the baptism operation as a marker, written in default font and 
in lower case. The marker is used for surface realization in the speak mode.
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The question is whether him refers indexically, e.g. to Tweety the bird, or coreferen-
tially to Speedy the mouse. For the speaker Sylvester the answer is clear because lan-
guage expressions are not ambiguous in the speak mode. For Hector as the hearer, 
however, the answer is unknown.For successful communication, Hector must use the 
same reference mechanism, indexical or coreferential, as Sylvester.
Formally, the two possible hear mode interpretations compare as follows:
Indexical interpretation of him


noun: pro2
fnc: hear
prn: 79




verb: hear
arg: pro2 pro3
pc: (hide 78)
prn: 79




noun: pro3
fnc: hear
prn: 79




S: garden
T: 2013-09-23T08:20:00
A: Hector
R: Sylvester
3rd: Tweety
prn: 78-79


This hear mode interpretation uses Hector’s STAR with a STAR-2 conversion29 of the 
content from pro1 to pro2. Represented as pro3, him points at the Tweety value of the 
3rd attribute in the STAR.30
Next consider Hector’s coreferential interpretation of him as referring to Speedy:
Coreferential interpretation of him


noun: Speedy
fnc: hide
prn: 78




verb: hide
arg: Speedy
mdr: cupboard
nc: (hear 79)
prn: 78




noun: cupboard
mdd: hide
prn: 78




noun: pro2
fnc: hear
prn: 79




verb: hear
arg: pro2 (Speedy 78)
pc: (hide 78)
prn: 79




noun: (Speedy 78)
fnc: hear
prn: 79




S: garden
T: 2013-09...
A: Hector
R: Sylvester
3rd:
prn: 78-79


The representation of the first proposition is the same as in “Indexical interpretation of 
him”. The STAR is different, however, in that its 3rd attribute has no value. Represented 
as the address value (Speedy 78), him is interpreted coreferentially.
29 Hausser (2011), Chap. 10.
30 The indexical interpretation of pro2 and pro3 is defined to refer to the R and 3rd values, respectively, of the STAR. For 
a more extensive treatment see Hausser (2011) Chaps. 10, 11.
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De dicto/de re
A puzzle in ancient philosophy of language has been called the de dicto/de re ambiguity 
by medieval logicians, e.g. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) and William of Occam (1288–
1347).31 More recently, roughly the same distinction has been called uneven/even by 
Frege (1892), opaque/transparent by Quine (1960), and intensional/extensional by Mon-
tague (1973). The de dicto/de re ambiguity occurs with certain verbs and modal 
operators.
The de dicto reading arising with verbs constitutes an exception to two fundamental 
laws of medieval semantics, known as (1) Existential Generalization and (2) Substitutiv-
ity of Identicals (Hausser 1999, Sect. 20.4). Existential Generalization fails if the meaning 
of a noun is equated with its real world referent (ontological assumption) and the refer-
ent doesn’t exist.
This is illustrated by Montague (op. cit.) as follows:
Different entailments of existence
a. De re
John finds a unicorn. > There exists a unicorn.
b. De dicto/de re
John seeks a unicorn. > There exists a unicorn.
In example b, the entailment fails (≯) if John is looking for any old unicorn (de dicto), 
because there might not exist one. It is also possible, however, that John is looking for a 
particular unicorn, in which case the referent exists (de re). Example a, in contrast, has 
only a de re reading (>).
This difference between examples a and b is caused by their different verbs. In the ter-
minology of Montague, find creates an extensional context in which truth of the premise 
entails truth of the conclusion, while seek creates an intensional context in which truth 
of the premise does not. Technically, Montague treats the de dicto/de re alternative pro-
duced by an intensional verb as a scope ambiguity based on the position of the quantifier 
used to represent a unicorn in predicate calculus.
DBS takes a different approach: (1) reference is treated as a purely cognitive relation 
between two contents (“Constellations of generalized reference”), (2) there are neither 
quantifiers nor any of the scope ambiguities they create (Hausser 2006, Sect. 6.4), and (3) 
ambiguity arises only in recognition, including the hear mode,32 but not in action.
For example, if the agent is looking for a spoon (action) in an unfamiliar house, this 
content is represented as follows:
31 For an overview see Dutilh Novaes (2004).
32 Even an ambiguity deliberately created in the speak mode (“diplomatic ambiguity,” Pehar 2001) arises only for the 
hearer.
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Nonlanguage action using de dicto reference
member proplets now front owner value
. . .


noun: spoon type
fnc: seek
prn: 67


spoon
The search would be successful if the context were to provide a token matching the 
type (“Reference by matching without language”). However, because the fnc value is the 
intensional verb seek, no assumption about the outcome is made at this point.
In a familiar house, in contrast, the agent may be looking for a particular spoon. In 
DBS, this de re constellation is represented as the following token line:
Nonlanguage action using de re reference
member proplets now front owner value
. . .


noun: spoon token
fnc: have
prn: 67

 . . .


noun: (spoon 67)
fnc: seek
prn: 93


spoon
The second spoon proplet, here with the prn value 93, has an antecedent serving as the 
initial referent, here with the prn value 67. The agent refers by address to the spoon 
being searched for (“Reference by address (coreference)”).
If the action is language production, e.g. uttering “I am looking for a spoon”, the 
speaker knows full well whether the intended reference mechanism is “Nonlanguage 
action using de dicto reference” or “Nonlanguage action using de re reference”. In the 
hear mode, in contrast, there is a pragmatic ambiguity. Communication is successful if 
the hearer selects the reading meant by the speaker.
In DBS, the failing Existential Generalization on the hearer’s de dicto interpretation 
(“Different entailments of existence”) is implemented as an inference. The antecedent 
pattern ensures that the input noun proplet (1) has a non-address core value, (2) is indef-
inite, and (3) has an intensional verb as its fnc value. The consequent pattern derives the 
new proposition the unicorn might not exist.
The valid Existential Generalization of the corresponding de re interpretation is also 
derived by a hear mode inference. The antecedent pattern ensures that there is an initial 
referent which the unicorn proplet is coreferent with (as in “Nonlanguage action using 
de re reference”). The consequent pattern derives the new proposition the unicorn exists 
(no negation in the sem slot of the verb).
The de dicto/de re distinction in its application to a transitive verb construction may 
be summarized as follows. If the verb is extensional or the object noun is definite, the 
interpretation is de re for speaker and hearer. If the verb is intensional (in the sense 
of Montague) and the noun is indefinite, in contrast, the interpretation depends on 
whether or not the indefinite noun has an antecedent, i.e. an initial referent which it 
refers to by address (coreference). If the answer is yes (“Nonlanguage action using de re 
reference”), the interpretation is de re, otherwise de dicto (“Nonlanguage action using de 
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dicto reference”). For the speaker, who knows the answer, the intended interpretation is 
a matter of choice. For the hearer, who doesn’t know the answer, the alternative interpre-
tations constitute a pragmatic ambiguity.
Finally consider the nature of existence, the entailment of which is at the center of the 
de dicto/de re distinction (“Different entailments of existence”). In the ontology of an 
agent-based approach (“Conceptual reconstruction of reference”), there are two kinds: 
(1) real existence, as in immediate reference (“Immediate reference as a purely cognitive 
procedure”), and (2) assumed existence, as in mediated reference. For example, when the 
noun unicorn is used de re in a piece of fiction (mediated reference), the unicorn exists 
in the story, but the kind of existence is fictional in that no agent-external counterpart is 
entailed.
Conclusion
The construction of an artificial cognitive agent with language (talking robot) is an inter-
disciplinary project which requires the cooperation of linguistics, philosophy, psychol-
ogy, artificial intelligence, cybernetics, mathematical complexity theory, and robotics. It 
challenges the participating sciences to cooperate within a consistent, comprehensive, 
computationally verifiable framework.
The linguistic part of designing a talking robot is reconstructing the cycle of natural 
language communication, consisting of the hear, the think, and the speak mode (“Cycle 
of natural language communication”). The philosophical part includes the computational 
reconstruction of the different mechanisms of generalized reference, as shown here in 
“Reference by matching (symbol)” to “Reference by address (coreference)”. The part of 
cybernetics and artificial intelligence is the design of an autonomous control which is 
capable of dealing with unfamiliar situations in the agent’s ecological niche, with long-
term survival as the standard of success.
These are theoretical tasks which require the design of a data structure, a database 
schema, an algorithm, and a functional flow connecting the agent’s recognition and 
action. They are essential for the hardware development of an artificial agent because 
they provide the robotic interfaces for recognition and action (“Physical framework of 
communication”) with an agent-internal cognitive system to map into and out of.
A continuous cycle of upscaling and computational verification constitutes a self-cor-
recting research strategy. Based on the identification and permanent correction of errors 
as well as the inclusion of more and more phenomena, systematic upscaling allows to 
approximate completeness of function and of data coverage
Direct access to the cognition of a talking robot via the service channel (Hausser 2006, 
Sect. 2.4.3) allows to view the reasoning of the artificial agent objectively, providing epis-
temology in philosophy and behavior modeling in psychology with the possibility of 
computational testing as a modern methodology. Regular software releases containing 
the improvements of the last upscaling cycle may be used by paying subscribers to sat-
isfy their natural language processing needs, resulting in solid long-term funding.
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